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6
Client Selection
How Lawyers Reflect and Influence Community Values
LYNN MATHER

In "The OvenBird's Song," David Engel investigates the relationship between
law and social change in a rural Midwestern community through an ethnographic study of civil litigation, especially personal injury cases. The evocative
title of his article refers to Robert Frost's poem "The Oven Bird," in which the
bird/singer responds to perceived disintegration and decay from change in the
seasons. The poem is similar, Engel writes, to popular perceptions of personal
injury claims in Sander County- perceptions that were strongly influenced by
"social changes as local residents experienced them and by the sense that
traditional relationships and exchanges in the community were gradually
disintegrating."' In Chapters 5 and 7 of this book, Marshall and Hans each
explore ways in which institutionalized legal practices mediate between
people's perceptions of the law and their engagement with law. In this
chapter, I focus on lawyers, because lawyers also constitute a crucial set of
institutional actors connecting culture, community, and law.
When representing community residents, lawyers articulate their ideas and
values while simultaneously translating abstract legal concepts, rights, and
procedures for those who need - or want - to use them. Lawyers thus play a
significant intermediary role in society. How do they perform this role? The
most visible way lies in lawyers' advocacy at trial, through public performances
of attorneys arguing before judges and juries on behalf of their clients. But
over time, fewer and fewer legal cases in the United States have been resolved
by adversary trial. Bench and jury trials constituted only 1.1 percent of all
civil case dispositions in federal courts in 2015,2 and only 4 percent of all civil
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cases in state courts in 2013. 3 Since most cases are settled by negotiation
without trial, a second way to observe lawyers' intermediary role lies in the
process of case settlement. For example, what is the "going rate" for a guilty
plea in different kinds of crimes or for settling cases in civil law? Such
settlements anticipate likely outcomes at trial and are thus bargained "in the
shadow of the law."4 Plaintiffs' lawyers in Sander County, knowing that local
judges and juries were hostile to personal injury suits, generally counseled
their clients against trials and advised them to accept informal negotiated
settlements instead.
Yet even before aJtorneys engage in negotiations or argue a case at trial, they
must agree to represent someone. A lawyer's decision to represent a client or to
reject someone's claim constitutes a third way in which lawyers mediate
between communities and the law. Claimants or defendants in civil cases
proactively seek out legal counsel, but individual lawyers are under no obligation to represent any particular client. The most common reason suggested for
rejecting clients is economic: Either clients lack sufficient funds to pay for an
hourly fee lawyer or else their cases are unlikely to generate sufficient reward
for a contingency fee lawyer. Unlike criminal cases in which indigent clients
are legally entitled to a defense lawyer, clients in civil cases in the United
States have no such constitutional right. I discuss client selection in this
chapter because, although rarely visible, lawyers' discretionary actions in
choosing clients are crucial for determining access to the civil legal system.
Moreover, such decisions illustrate well how attorneys reinforpe community
values when they embrace certain cases and reject others. We also see
occasions where lawyers seek to challenge and perhaps change those values
by representing the claims of"outsiders"- those socially or culturally marginal
members of the community.
Engel's study of community and law shows that residents of Sander Country
disapproved of formal legal action to recover for personal injuries. Instead,
they believed in individual responsibility and self-sufficiency, seeing accidents
as just part oflife and not wanting to "cash in" on their misfortune by blaming
others. Those who did file injury claims were seen as "troublemakers" and
often were newcomers to the community- migrants, Latinos, union workers,
and so forth. Lawyers reinforced community perceptions by discouraging
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potential plaintiffs and accepting as clients only those with "real, nonfrivolous
grievances."5 Unlike the stereotypical plaintiff attorney who zealously pursues
tort litigation, attorneys in Sander County actively discouraged it. The question is: Why? Engel's article suggests three reasons for the lawyers' behavior in
client selection: lawyers' economic incentives, social networks, and - most
significant in his analysis- shared cultural values. In what follows I will focus
on these three, plus a fourth: formal law. Each explanation provides insight
into how and why lawyers reflect community values when they agree to
represent certain clients. Yet each answer also suggests why some lawyers
might challenge or seek to change those traditional community values. For
example, lawyers who perceive themselves to be outside of a homogeneous
community might select clients who share their outsider status or whose cases
could provide an impetus for legal or social change.
The empirical literature on the legal profession - including client selection - has grown enormously since 1984, when Engel's article was published.
Interestingly, Engel's provocative analysis anticipates findings that emerged
after his path breaking study, such as the importance of cultural over economic
incentives for lawyers and the lack of any formal law constraining lawyers in
client selection. I draw on this recent research to explore how lawyers select
clients not only in personal injury cases but in other civil matters as well.
I confine my discussion to areas of law with individual (rather than organizational) clients, given the well-known differences in the legal profession
between these two hemispheres. 6
Individuals with claims of personal injury or employment discrimination
rarely have funds to pay attorneys an hourly fee and thus depend on lawyers in
contingency fee practices. Lawyers in such practices are quite selective,
rejecting the majority of clients who contact them.7 Rates of rejection vary
widely, however, depending on a lawyer's specialization, experience, location,
case volume, and average case value. 8 Lawyers. paid by hourly fees also
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scrutinize individuals seeking their help in order to be assured of payment and
to avoid ethical problems such as conflict of interest or malpractice complaints. Divorce lawyers in one study overwhelmingly said that they screened
potential clients before agreeing to representation. 9 And considerable bar
commentary warns lawyers to choose their clients carefully since, by avoiding
difficult clients, attorneys may prevent problems later on in a case. This all
suggests, as Trautner notes, that the process of client selection may be as
important for understanding as the rate of client acceptance: "How do lawyers
think about screening?"'0 The answers below explore the four different perspectives on this question - economic, sociological, cultural, and legal - and
in the end they reinforce Engel's insistence on the powerful role of culture for
explaining lawyers' behavior.
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES

Although lawyers perform a public service, they also must earn a living. When
representing individuals in family matters, torts, real estate, or other civil
matters, new attorneys quickly learn that hard work and sympathy for clients
only go so far. They don't pay the rent, the phone bill, or a secretary. The most
common explanation of how lawyers think about screening centers on economic incentives. For contingency fee lawyers (who earn nothing unless the
client wins), what is the likelihood of their "winning" the case? Cases most
likely to be accepted should have legal merit and high damages. Kritzer's
survey of contingency fee lawyers, for example, found that "lack ofliability and
inadequate damages (together or singly) are the dominant reasons for declining cases, accounting for about 8o percent."" Other researchers, such as
Trautner, have found tort lawyers' perceptions of potential damages to be
even more important than liability in the decision to accept or reject a case."
Stratification in the plaintiffs' bar produces varying rates of client acceptance due to differences in the lawyers' practices. While many lawyers handle
auto accidents or slip-and-fall cases, a smaller group specializes in cases involving more severe injuries or greater complexity (such as medical malpractice).
Daniels and Martin distinguish between "bread and butter" plaintiff lawyers
and "heavy hitters" according to the average value of their typical cases, and
Lynn Mather, Craig A. McEwen, and Richard J. Maiman, Divorce Lawyers at Work: Varieties
of Professionalism in Practice (Oxford University Press, 1.001), p. 93·
11
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find the latter to be more selective in choosing clients.'3 High-end lawyers
scrutinize potential cases for reassurance that the damages recovered will
justify the time they invest. Kritzer, on the other hand, finds that high-volume
attorneys reject proportionately more clients than low-volume attorneys do,
perhaps because of the different referral patterns. 14 Lawyers handling a large
number of cases often rely on mass advertising or client referral for their
contacts, while those with fewer cases depend on attorney referrals, which
means that some lawyer screening has already occurred. Each of these various
personal injury practices rests on its own pattern of risks and rewards.'5
Hourly fee lawyers also balance risk and reward in client selection. The risks
for these attorneys involve investing more time than the client will be able to
pay for, not getting paid at the end of a case, taking on too many cases and
consequently neglecting some, or being pushed by a client to engage in
ethical misconduct. Research on the divorce bar in New England conducted
by myself and two co-authors reveals how some lawyers charge low fees and
attract a large number of lower-income clients, others charge more per hour
and require a modest retainer up front, and high-end divorce attorneys
demand a large retainer and charge high fees.' 6 We found that the average
number of hours lawyers invested in a case, the nature of advocacy, and the
length of the divorce process were associated with these different business
models of divorce practice. That is, "having clients with few financial assets
prompts attorneys to limit sharply what they do in the average case, while
having clients with deeper pockets encourages expansion of billable hours and
increased use of the formal legal process."'7
Economic incentives in client selection are also shown in Michelson's
study of Chinese lawyers at work. He finds that lawyers' financial insecurity
and the conditions of solo legal practice in Beijing lead to their frequent
rejection of cases with low fee potential. ' 8 As noted earlier, the legal merit
of a case matters in client selection because it could produce a good financial outcome for both the lawyer and the client. But as Michelson notes,
"the boundaries of 'legal merit' are flexible and malleable," reflecting and
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reproducing cultural stereotypes.'9 Chinese lawyers' aversion to clients with
labor disputes (compared to clients with housing or commercial conflicts)
underscores Michelson's point. Client characteristics such as attractiveness,
credibility, or "likeability"20 also influence lawyers in client selection, in part
because of how such characteristics might influence a judge or jury. As Engel
explains in "The OvenBird's Song," personal injury lawyers evaluate potential
clients and negotiate case settlements using their "shared knowledge of the
likely juror reaction if the case actually went to trial." 21 Trautner's research
comparing client selection in states with tort reform and those without reform
strongly supports this argument, showing how "lawyers frame cases in ways
they expect to appeal to what they believe the jury will find compelling in the
context of their own localized legal cultures."22 Hence, even· when attorneys
are thinking about their own self-interest - if and how they will be paid - they
are reflecting community values in their predictions about case outcomes.
Attorneys (especially those in solo practice) have considerable autonomy in
setting fees, so they can adjust them downward for sympathetic individuals or
upward to deter to difficult ones. The category of the "difficult" client emerges
frequently in studies of client selection. When divorce lawyers in New England were asked to describe which clients they rejected, about half said those
who are "difficult," variously defined as "vengeful, unrealistic, stubborn, or
demanding"; "those who won't listen to you"; and "cli.ents I'm not comfortable with."' 3 Lawyers in Beijing said they rejected clients "who are unreasonably demanding," "who try to direct my work," or "who won't stop pestering
me." 24 Personal injury lawye;s interviewed by Kritzer said they sometimes
hesitated to represent "high-maintenance" clients or those who engaged in
lawyer shopping.'5 And employment discrimination lawyers considered the
plaintiffs demeanor when deciding on representation; one lawyer interviewed
"said he had a 'sixth sense' for 'difficult' clients, meaning that they would
become 'accusatory' or 'whin[y] in the course of the lawyer-client relationship."'6 Since lawyers hesitate to turn away business- even that of difficult or
"whiny" clients - they sometimes charge a higher hourly fee or increase the
size of their retainer to compensate for the difficulty anticipated in representation. As one divorce lawyer said, "I don't mind a pain if they are going to
' 9 Ibid, 5·
"" Trautner, "Tort reform."
"' Eng.el, "The oven bird's song," 564-5.
" Mary Nell Trautner, "Personal responsibility v. corporate liability: how personal injury lawyers
screen cases in an era of tort reform," Sociology of Crime, Law and Deviance, 12. (2.009), 2.03-30,
at 2.2.7.
'l Mather et al., Divorce Lawyers at Work, pp. 93-4"~ Michelson, 'The practice oflaw," 2.0.
' 5 Kritzer, Risks, Reputations, and Rewards, p. 86.
6
' Myrick et al., "Race and representation," 744·
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pay mel" 2 7 Similarly, Michelson reports that some Chinese lawyers would
tolerate the "risk and the annoyances associated with 'difficult' clients if the fee
potential of the case [was) sufficiently attractive.'"8
A small number of divorce lawyers in New England took this rational
calculation even further to carve out a market niche for themselves - one
that appealed directly to vengeful or unreasonable clients and offered to act as
a hired gun for them. Unlike most divorce lawyers, who invoked the norms of
reasonableness of their legal communities, these attorneys rejected cooperation and instead embraced a more aggressive "Rambo"-style representation.
They knew they could attract clients this way, especially those stubborn or
angry clients who were unwilling to listen to attorneys' pleas to be patient and
realistic about their divorce. 2 9
By pursuing their economic self-interest when selecting clients, lawyers thus
reflected community values by predicting jurors' responses to those clients, or
by aiding clients in resolving their conflicts in cooperative or adversarial ways
depending on the interests of the individuals - and the lawyers.

SOCIAL NETWORKS AND RELATIONS HIPS

The fact that lawyers practice within social networks offers a second explanation for how they select their clients. Lawyers' ongoing interactions and close
relationships in a community profoundly shape the way in which they do their
work. In "The Oven Bird's Song," Engel explains the local bar's disinterest
in filing personal injury claims as due in part to the social network of professional practice: "Sander County lawyers were seen as closely linked to the
kinds of individuals and businesses against whom tort actions were typically
brought." 30 That is, since lawyers are embedded in a social hierarchy, they are
reluctant to accept clients wanting to sue those whom the lawyers generally
represent. Indeed, Engel's data from a sample of civil cases confirms this
point: Only 12.5 percent of the plaintiffs in tort cases were represented by
attorneys from Sander County, in contrast to 72.5 percent of the non-tort
plaintiffs who had legal counsel from the county.3' Thus, local lawyers did not
hesitate to represent plaintiffs in other areas of law - it was only the tort cases
that they avoided. Consequently, Sander County residents who sought legal
help for personal injury claims were often represented by one particular lawyer
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Mather et al., Divorce Lawyers at Work, p. 95·
,a Michelson, "The practice of law," 21.
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Mather et al., Divorce Lawyers at Work, pp. 85-6.
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Ibid.
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who lived just over the county line, a lawyer who readily admitted to Engel:
''I'm not part of the establishment."3~
This lawyer's comment underscores two different aspects of a lawyer's social
network. Not only do ongoing relationships constrain lawyers in their work;
so also does the hierarchy of the legal community. Van Hoy's research on
Indiana lawyers, Parikh's on the Chicago bar, and Daniels and Martin's on the
Texas bar reveal a great deal about the role of hierarchy among personal injury
lawyers. 33 Each finds substantial stratification shaped by geographic reach,
type and volume of cases, and specialization. Parikh notes that this hierarchy is
"less obvious to outsiders," although well known within the bar.34 Ranging
from attorneys with a small number of high-value, complex cases to those
handling many routine auto accidents, the bar depends heavily on cooperation for referrals. High-end practitioners refer low-value cases down the
hierarchy and low-end practitioners return the favor (since the latter lack
the resources to handle a specialized case and also could not shoulder that
degree of risk). Additional referral partners come from small firms representing
individuals on matters outside of personal injury. Parikh finds that the ties
among referral partners are long-lasting, involve frequent contact, and are
personal (rather than firm-based). These embedded ties among personal
injury lawyers, Parikh suggests, not only shape the clientele that each represents, but also reproduce the stratification and hierarchy of the profession as
a whole. 35
Throughout the United States, 63 percent of private practitioners work
36
either as solo practitioners or in small firms of one to five lawyers. That
does not mean, however, that these individuals are working entirely on their
own, unconstrained in selecting clients or deciding how to represent them.
Networks of attorneys, stemming in part from market considerations but also
from ongoing social and professional interactions, create informal norms,
mutual dependencies, and common standards. These "communities of practice," as my co-authors and I call them, include groups of lawyers practicing in a particular locality and those within a specific legal field such as
personal injury or divorce.37 Our research on divorce lawyers in Maine and
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New Hampshire, for example, describes a hierarchy among divorce practitioners quite similar to the personal injury bar: High-end attorneys often face each
other in two-lawyer divorce cases involving considerable assets, while divorce
attorneys with working-class clients rarely face a lawyer on the other side and
seek to finalize divorces as quickly and efficiently as possible. We also found
among most of the divorce lawyers whom we interviewed a generally shared
commitment to being reasonable, sharing information when asked, seeking
to settle cases amicably, and avoiding unnecessary litigation. As noted in the
previous section, however, a few lawyers in each locality rejected this norm of
the reasonable lawyer and sought to carve out a market niche of their own, in
some ways acting similarly to the lawyer in Sander County who said he wasn't
part of the establishment.
Research on legal practice in small towns and rural areas shows how
pervasive and influential these social networks can be. In small, tightly knit
communities with ongoing social relationships, lawyers advocate for clients
within the confines of those networks. Landon's study of lawyers in rural
Missouri shows how lawyers redefined advocacy to avoid excessive zeal,
cooperating with other attorneys and tamping down any client expectations
of adversarial conflict in ;rder to preserve the social fabric.3 8 Recent research
by Li on case screening in rural China points to a similar phenomenon - i.e.,
"relational embeddedness," referring to "concrete and durable relationships
among law practitioners, clients, adversaries, and the communities these
individuals inhabit." 39 Li's fieldwork in Chinese law offices finds that economic incentives explain some of their decisions on client selection, but
she argues that economics was not the overriding determinant. Indeed, this
2016 study provides considerable evidence showing that "when faced with
social obligations derived from kinship, friendship, and community membership, legal workers often put monetary interests on the back burner.''40 Some
of the crucial non-monetary incentives that influenced client selection
include the exchange of favors, the need to uphold moral obligations and
show respect, and a desire to avoid social fallout.
Although research on relational embeddedness typically emphasizes its
positive benefits for communities, Li draws on her research to point out
its negative aspects, namely legal workers' tendency to support the more
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powerful party in disputes and thereby reinforce existing social inequalities.
By agreeing to represent some clients and reject others, and to give priority to
certain types of cases, law practitioners in rural China - like the lawyers in
Sander County who would not represent personal injury clients - reinforce
dominant community values.

SHARED CULTURAL AND PERSONAL VALUES

In his discussion of lawyers and local values, Engel emphasizes that many of
the lawyers he interviewed "were born and raised in the area" and thus "shared
the local tendency to censure those who aggressively asserted personal injury
claims."4' Just like the insurance adjusters who downgraded injury claims and
the jurors and judges who disapproved of. tort cases, lawyers in Sander County
grew up in the community and shared its ideas and beliefs. That is to say, even
the few attorneys who agreed to represent plaintiffs in injury cases had internalized the community's hostile view of these claims.
In the traditional bar account of lawyers' choices about client representation
or advocacy, lawyers' personal values have no bearing on their professional
conduct. Instead, the norms of the profession and professional socialization
have ostensibly "bleached out" attorneys' personal attributes, based on race,
gender, religion, or social background. 42 But the indeterminacy of law and the
wide discretion enjoyed by attorneys provide considerable space for lawyers'
own personal identities and values to affect their professional decisions.
Implicit biases regarding race, religion, or gender also influence lawyers'
judgment. Further, the fact that others (judges, opposing lawyers, clients,
witnesses, etc.) consciously or unconsciously treat lawyers according to their
gender or race may lead - or even in some way oblige -women and minority
attorneys to reflect their own personal identities in their professional work.43
When seeking an attorney, potential litigants often look for someone with
certain personal attributes in addition to the requisite professional qualities.
Representation by an attorney of the same gender, race, or ethnicity can
promote trust, and some clients believe it may improve the lawyer-client
4'
42
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Engel, "The ovenbird's song," 565.
Levinson coined the term "bleached out professionalism" to describe the belief that lawyers'
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relationship. Thus, regardless of how gender or race-blind the attorney is, or
aspires to be, client perceptions and expectations may affect their relationship.
At the same time, implicit or explicit biases can influence lawyers' responses
to those seeking their services. A large study of employment discrimination
claims in federal court found that Mrican-Americans are almost twice as
likely as whites to lack legal representation. Part of this may be due to Black
plaintiffs' lack of trust in the legal profession (given that nearly all specialist
lawyers are white), but part might also be explained by lawyers' implicit
biases -their perceptions of Black clients as being more difficult, less credible,
or harder to work with. 44
Women divorce lawyers report that potential clients often contact them
because of their gender. Some wives say they feel more comfortable talking to
a woman lawyer, while others believe that a woman will better understand
their problems and fight harder for them. And some women divorce lawyers
admit they prefer to represent wives. Checking the docket records of over
6,ooo divorce cases in New England, my colleagues and I found that female
attorneys disproportionately represent wives in divorce cases.45 Some women
divorce lawyers we interviewed described their enjoyment of divorce work due
to the intimacy and close emotional bond they could forge with a largely
female clientele. Women attorneys are also more likely than men to specialize
in divorce, and one specialist, for example, extolled the perfect match between
her personal values and divorce law: "It was just a very good fit because I love
people, and I've always been very interested in human relations, so it's a just
a natural."46
Research on immigration lawyers reveals the importance of national and
ethnic background for this area of practice. Levin's survey of immigration
lawyers in New York City found that one-third were immigrants themselves,
while the same proportion were born in the US and had at least one parent
who was foreign-born. 47 Although these attorneys had many different reasons
for initially entering the immigration field, they continued to represent immigrants because this area of practice "resonated with their own history or
because of a desire to help others" - especially others like themselves.48
Historically, religious identity directly affected lawyers' selection of clients
and areas of practice, as Jews and Catholics were barred from elite law firms
for much of the twentieth century. Consequently, these attorneys gravitated
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to personal plight fields of law, representing individuals in criminal cases,
personal injuries, or family matters, and contributing to the social stratification
of the legal profession still noted today. 49 Lawyers' religious beliefs may affect
the selection of individual clients through the particular values of their
practice, as, for instance, when Jewish lawyers work for social justice or serve
the poor as part of their religious faith, so or when Catholic lawyers integrate
moral analysis with their legal counselingY But religious values can exert an
even stronger influence on attorneys through legal obligation- for example, to
canon or Jewish law. During the 1950s, for instance, Catholic lawyers were
forbidden by Church doctrine from representing clients in a divorce action
without prior approval from their local bishop and any lawyer ignoring this
2
command would be committing "a seriously sinful act."5 Similarly, some
rabbis have ruled that Jewish lawyers should not represent clients as plaintiffs
unless they have first sought to resolve their conflicts in a rabbinical court. 53
Levinson notes, however, that the question of the Catholic or Jewish lawyer "is
not precisely analogous to questions involving other attributes like gender,
race, or ethnicity," since the latter may suggest "distinctive way of looking
at the world" whereas the former may in fact involve a matter of competing
legal obligation. 54
Increased diversity in the contemporary legal profession and changing
expectations of the lawyer-client relationship pose challenges for a distinct
professional identity. For instance, Mah argues that new Latino and AsianAmerican immigrant communities have social norms and worldviews that are
poorly served by the bar, not because of too few Latino and Asian lawyers but
because of professional norms such as client autonomy and lawyer neutrality,
which clash with the norms of these immigrant communities. 55 Similarly, a
detailed analysis of American Indian tribal litigation by Carpenter and Wald
underscores the obstacles confronting tribal attorneys when representing their
tribes because of professional bar rules that are not well suited for group
lawyering.56 These scholars see great advantage in allowing lawyers to have
"thick" professional identities - closely identifying with their clients - but
49
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others, such as Spaulding, view such intense identification as "self-interested
perversion" of the professional norm of service. 57
These last points have special resonance in light of Engel's exploration
of law and social change in Sander County. When social outsiders in that
community - newcomers or those with a different ethnic or religious background -were injured in accidents, they struggled to find help from the local
lawyers. But lawyers located outside of the county were willing to represent
the injured claimants and to fight in court on their behalf. Being outsiders
themselves, these attorneys were less likely to share the cultural values of
Sander County.

FORMAL LAW

Interestingly, as Konefsky notes in his chapter about "The OvenBird's Song,"
formal law plays little or no role in explaining civil litigation in Sander
County. Cultural, social, and economic influences loom much larger in
Engel's analysis, both for understanding who uses the court to recover for
injuries and for showing how lawyers decide which injury plaintiffs to accept
or reject. Indeed, the broader question of how lawyers think about client
selection in civil cases is also surprisingly unconstrained by law. Historically,
lawyers in the US have enjoyed nearly complete professional autonomy to
decide upon client representation. By contrast, barristers in the UK have
traditionally followed a "cab-rank" rule in which they are expected to take
clients in the order in which they arrive at barristers' chambers. Empirical
research, however, shows that this English rule is "widely thought to be
honored mostly in the breach."58
Professional rules of conduct in the US focus on those whom lawyers
cannot represent, but the rules impose no conditions on client acceptance.
Specifically, ABA Model Rule 1.16 prohibits lawyers from accepting a client if
the representation would result in a violation of professional conduct rules,
such as a lawyer's conflict of interest. Even if a court appoints an attorney to
represent a client, the attorney can refuse the appointment if the client or the
cause is "repugnant" to the lawyer.59 Moreover, once the client is accepted,
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a lawyer can still withdraw if he/she "considers [the client's objectives] repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement." 60 In short,
other than avoiding conflicts of interest or clients who want to commit fraud,
attorneys are generally free to reject clients for any reason whatsoever.
Nevertheless, the question of whether lawyers may refuse to represent
individuals based on race, ethnicity, religion, gender, or any other protected
category - just as other private businesses are legally constrained - has been a
controversial subject of debate for decades. The ABA and state bars have
wrestled with how best to promote anti-discrimination within the legal profession - whether by the more general state anti-discrimination statutes or by
ethical conduct rules specific to the legal profession. Although nearly all states
have public accommodations statutes prohibiting discrimination, there is only
one case on record applying such law to lawyers -a 2003 Massachusetts court
decision against a feminist lawyer who refused to represent a man in a divorce
action. 61 Other states have professional conduct rules that prohibit discrimination }n the practice of law or within the profession, but these do not apply to
client selection. In August 2016, this debate came to a head with a vote by the
American Bar Association to add a new paragraph (g) to 8.4 'in the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct to explicitly prohibit lawyers from knowingly
engaging in harassment or discrimination in the practice of law. However,
following this statement of prohibition, 8.4(g) adds a qualification: "This
paragraph does not limit the ability of a lawyer to accept, decline or withdraw
from a representation in accordance with Rule 1.16." 6~ In other words, even
with this controversial new rule change, it appears that attorneys continue to
enjoy professional autonomy to accept or reject clients as they see fit.
Commenting on this ethical gap in the rules, Professor Allen described the
dilemma raised by a student in her Professional Responsibility class: "Wait a
minute, are you telling me that after I graduate I could hang out a shingle that
says, 'Lawyers for White People'?" Professor Allen acknowledged that numerous websites already advertise gender-based legal services in family law - such
as DAWN ("Divorce Attorneys for Women") or Family Law Attorneys for
Men. 63 Allen argues in her comments to the ABA that the harm of the current
ABA rule and the non-enforcement of most state anti-discrimination laws
for client selection by lawyers greatly undermine the legitimacy of the legal
6o

6
'
6
'
63

ABA Model Rule 1.16 (b) (4).
Nathanson v. Mass. Commission against Discrimination, 16 Mass L. Rptr 761 (Mass. Sup.
Ct. 2.003).
ABA Model Rule 8.4 (g).
Jessie Allen, Comments to ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, March
17, 2016, Re: Proposed Amendment to ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8+

The Oven Bird's Insights

system. It is certainly ironic that one's access to legal rights and legal institutions depends on lawyers as gatekeepers choosing to grant such access, and
yet the lawyers' own conduct in this process is largely unconstrained by law.

CONCLUSION

Lawyers express and reinforce dominant community values through their
screening of potential clients. Engel's article alerted scholars to the importance of this stage of the legal process, and, even more, to the nuance and
complexity involved in the process of client selection. Although economic
incentives for lawyers are the easiest to observe in screening decisions, when
examined more closely by Engel and then by later researchers those incentives
often turned out to rest on cultural assumptions - assumptions that are
reinforced by social networks. Thus, the emphasis in "The OvenBird's Song"
on the cultural values of residents and lawyers in Sander County to explain
client acceptance was prescient. Moreover, Engel's lack of attention to formal
law exerting constraints on lawyers remains accurate today, since lawyers are
still largely unregulated in their selection of clients.
Let me conclude by suggesting that these same factors that link the process
of client selection to community values also point to how and why lawyers
may occasionally help to bring about change. That is, by representing marginal voices in society, initiating new kinds of lawsuits, or making new legal
arguments, lawyers select clients and present their cases in ways that may
influence community values. The process of litigation requires, as Engel
writes, that "norms and values that once patterned behavior unthinkingly
or unconsciously must now be articulated, explained, and defended." 64 For
example, when a criminal lawyer defended her female client for killing her
husband after years of his pqysical abuse, the lawyer introduced the wife, not
the husband, as the victim, and thereby extended the concept of self-defense
to include victims of domestic violence. In so doing, the lawyer asked the
community to re-think its norms about violence within families, gender
relations, and protections of criminal law. When a lawyer agreed to represent
a gay client seeking a marriage certificate, he was challenging taken-forgranted assumptions about the legal definition of marriage and forcing them
to be "articulated, explained, and defended." 65 As gay marriage cases made
their way through the appellate courts, the traditional defense of marriage as a
heterosexual institution broke down against constitutional claims of equal
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protection. Numerous other cases abound in which minority views within a
local community (whether liberal or conservative voices) have found expression through litigation and ended up challenging community values and
ultimately changing the law.
Why do lawyers agree to represent clients against such overwhelming odds?
For the same reasons that lawyers select clients based upon dominant community values. These lawyers may share the cultural ideas of their clients,
perhaps seeing themselves as cause lawyers who use law to confront dominant
norms. Or, the lawyers may have also experienced the marginal social status of
their clients, whether due to gender, sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, or
something else within the social hierarchy of the legal profession. Or, the
lawyers may be willing to take a risk with certain clients because they see
possible economic benefits from representing them. For instance, my research
a few decades ago revealed a small number of women divorce lawyers in New
England who represented their clients - wives - in ways that challenged the
status quo of small-town family law practice, which tended to favor husbands.
These women lawyers embraced aggressive legal advocacy because of a commitment to feminist principles (cultural values), their own marginalization by
the largely male divorce bar (social network), and recognition of a market
niche (economic incentive). 66 Other examples abound in which lawyers
marginalized within their own communities, such as lawyers from racial or
ethnic minority backgrounds, represent their peers to reflect and confront
wrongful treatment or to assert legal rights. While in some cases these practitioners were part of organized political networks seeking legal change, others
were simply individual lawyers who felt sidelined in their own communities
because of their identities or values and sought to represent clients in order to
remedy the situation.
The study of lawyers as they decide whom to represent in litigation may
seem at first blush to be an insignificant topic, but "The Oven Bird's Song"
showed its importance for understanding the role lawyers play in mediating
community values and law. Considerable scholarship since Engel's article has
built on and extended his insights. The process of client selection shows how
lawyers typically reflect, but on occasion may influence, community values.
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